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Abstract 
Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations has grown to become a po-
werful intergovernmental body enjoying respect and legitimacy among a large 
part of the international community. Unfortunately, since the 1990s there have 
been recurrent problems with the organization’s peacekeeping forces being accu-
sed of sexual violence against the very people they are supposed to protect. In 
this article, the UN’s management of events in the Central African Republic 
(CAR) in 2014 and its inability to put an end to the sexual assaults committed by 
its representatives have been used to explore whether the organization could be 
accused of a state crime – under the presumption that the UN can be equated 
with a state. To do this, the definition of state crime and the complicity continuum 
developed by Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003) are used to evaluate the 
UN’s actions in relation to the events in the CAR. The responsibilities of the UN 
in situations like the one in the CAR are examined and discussed. 
Abstract 
Förenta nationerna har sedan starten 1945 utvecklats till en mäktig mellanstatlig 
organisation som åtnjuter respekt och legitimitet från majoriteten av det interna-
tionella samfundet. Dessvärre har det, sedan 1990-talet, vid upprepade tillfällen 
uppdagats att organisationens fredsbevarande styrkor anklagats för sexuellt våld 
mot just de grupper som de är satta att beskydda. I denna artikel användes orga-
nisationens hantering av händelserna i Centralafrikanska republiken (CAR) un-
der 2014, samt dess oförmåga att stoppa sexuella övergrepp utförda av dess före-
trädare, för att undersöka om FN kunde anklagas för en statligt brott, under 
förutsättning att organisationen kan likställas med en stat. För detta användes 
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wasi, Gustav Grut and Evelina Jansson for rewarding discussions and comments. 
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Kauzlarich, Mullins och Matthews (2003) definition av statlig brottslighet, samt 
det complicity continuum som de utvecklat, för att utvärdera FN:s åtgärder under 
händelserna i CAR. FN:s ansvar i situationer som det i CAR problematiseras och 
diskuteras. 
Introduction 
Since its establishment after the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) and 
its peacekeeping forces have enjoyed a high level of trust from the international 
community and the civilian groups whom they have been assigned to protect 
(Deschamps, Jallow & Sooka, 2015:i). However, since the 1990s, media and hu-
man rights organizations have repeatedly reported about sexual exploitation and 
assault perpetrated by UN peacekeeping forces. In 1996 the UN compiled a re-
port on the effects of armed conflicts on children. The author stated that the arri-
val of peacekeeping troops was associated with a rapid increase in child prostitu-
tion in 6 of the 12 countries studied in the report (Machel, 1996:31). Since the re-
porting started almost thirty years ago, many UN missions have been stained by 
allegations of sexual exploitation and assault, such as the missions in Kosovo, 
Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti (Deschamps, Jallow & 
Sooka, 2015:15). During these missions, peacekeepers were accused of crimes 
such as sexual exploitation of children, rape, and sexual assaults. One of the most 
notable cases in recent years is that of the Central African Republic (CAR), 
where women and children were raped and sexually abused. This article will 
from here on focus on the events in the CAR.  
 These cases raise the question of the accountability of powerful organizations 
such as the UN. It is a topic that is highly relevant to the field of criminology, and 
in particular to the area labeled Crimes of the powerful. For some time, there has 
been an increasing desire to use a definition of crime that is not based exclusively 
on politically created laws, but which also considers harm (Rothe et al., 2009:7). 
There are a variety of actions that may be non-criminal in strictly legal terms but 
which nonetheless cause a significant amount of social harm (Evertsson, 
2017:510; Tombs & Whyte, 2015:35). According to Rothe and Kauzlarich 
(2016:15), an act or omission can be considered a crime if it causes social harm 
and resembles an illegality, whether or not it constitutes an illegal act. In the 
global arena, we find states and corporations that both separately and together 
commit such actions for the benefit of their respective organizations, causing 
devastating harm to their victims (Rothe & Kauzlarich, 2016:7ff). In this context 
it is important to clarify that it is the individuals representing the state or corpora-
tion who commit the criminal acts, not the organizations themselves (Ibid:5).  
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 The sexual abuse committed against refugees in the CAR by peacekeeping 
soldiers was not only a grave abuse of the trust of the international community 
but could also be considered a crime against humanity and human rights due to 
the serious harm it caused (Deschamps et al., 2015:xiii). However, there is cur-
rently no legal entity whose jurisdiction covers intergovernmental bodies such as 
the UN. As the process of globalization has continued, the need for a discussion 
regarding the accountability of international organizations has become more and 
more prominent. Traditional accountability structures for states, and organiza-
tions that function like states, have proven insufficient for ascribing accountabil-
ity when harm is caused to civilians as a result of the actions or inaction of these 
institutions (Freedman, 2018:692).  
 Against this backdrop, this aticle aims to problematize the UN’s accountabil-
ity and responsibility in situations like that in the CAR. Since a state could be 
held accountable for such actions against its citizens, it does not seem unreasona-
ble to expect similar accountability from the UN. In order to put the events in a 
new perspective and to elaborate on the question of accountability for those in 
power, the UN will here be equated to a state. Based on this premise, this study 
will seek to answer the following research question: Can the UN be considered 
guilty of a state crime regarding the problem of recurrent sexual abuse and the 
organizational procedures and decisions taken in dealing with the sexual abuse 
committed by peacekeeping forces in the CAR? 
Method 
The article begins by explaining and defining the concept of state crime. It then 
presents a brief overview of the UN’s structure and functions, which is followed 
by a presentation of previous research in the field. A more detailed description of 
the events in the CAR is then provided as a basis for the subsequent analysis. The 
analysis will be based on the report of the independent investigation into the CAR 
situation, written by Deschamps, Jallow and Sooka (2015). The report was cho-
sen as the source for the analysis because of the scope of the investigation, and 
because it was conducted by an independent panel. The investigation was initiat-
ed after the events in the CAR had become public, and it thoroughly describes the 
crimes, the interorganizational procedures and internal investigations conducted 
by the UN, as well as the organization’s actions regarding the management of 
perpetrators, victims and the whistleblower Anders Kompass. In the analysis, the 
concept of state crime will be explored and compared to the described events. 
The article concludes with a discussion of the results. 
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State crime 
William Chambliss first defined state crime as “acts defined by law as criminal 
and committed by state officials in pursuit of their jobs as representatives of the 
state” (1988:184). The concept has since been broadened to include both acts that 
violate laws and harmful acts that are not necessarily criminalized, such as torture 
(Rothe & Kauzlarich, 2016:7). Also included are omissions resulting in harm, 
such as a state neglecting to provide sufficient aid during a natural disaster. Pow-
er is crucial to the concept, since it is power that creates the conditions for, and 
also permits and facilitates, harmful and potentially criminal behavior (Ibid:49). 
Power is closely linked to authority and trust; for example, politicians possess 
delegated power and are entrusted to make decisions in the public’s place, which 
are expected to be promotive of the public interest (Ibid:4). Sutherland (1940:5) 
believed that crimes committed by people with power primarily involve a viola-
tion of trust, which in turn harms the social relationships and morals of society at 
large.  
 Since a definition of state crime must be broad enough to be useful in many 
different contexts, Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003:244) have developed 
a definition that is suitable for both national and international contexts. It is based 
on five different criteria, which establish that a state crime: (1) causes harm to in-
dividuals, groups or property; (2) is the product of an act or omission from the 
state or any state actor; (3) the act or omission is directly linked to an assigned or 
implied trust or obligation; (4) is committed or omitted by a government agency, 
organization or representative, and; (5) is performed with a vested interest of (a) 
the state or (b) the ruling class. With the last criteria, this definition highlighted an 
important aspect of state crime which historically had not been as systematically 
researched, regarding who initiated the harmful action, the state or the power elite 
(Ibid:246). This broadens the concept as a differentiation is made between actions 
that benefit the state, and actions that benefit the ruling class.  
 Kauzlarich et al. (2003:248ff) have also developed a complicity continuum of 
state crime. On this continuum, there are four different levels of state complicity 
or state participation. Explicit acts of commission involve a state having acted in-
tentionally and purposefully, for example through genocide. Implicit acts of 
commission include actions through which a state supports developments that 
cause social harm; in this case, however, the state’s involvement is not as direct 
as in explicit acts of commission. Explicit acts of omission involve a state disre-
garding unsafe and/or dangerous conditions even though it has a responsibility to 
ensure that different situations and contexts meet certain security requirements. 
Implicit acts of omission involve cases in which a state, by not acting, allows 
Sandra Egelström – UNwilling or UNable? 
319 
harmful behavior from for example unequal, or marginalizing institutions and ac-
tors. What separates these two categories of acts of omission is the degree of neg-
ligence on the part of the state, and the extent to which the state has a responsibil-
ity to act.  
 Kauzlarich et al. (2003:251) note that although this continuum may be useful 
in studies of state crime, concrete examples may be more complex, since states 
can act in different directions simultaneously, and one state crime can, for exam-
ple, fit into multiple categories on the continuum. Using the continuum to estab-
lish the level of complicity and participation of the UN will serve as an assess-
ment of the organization’s awareness of the issue at hand, which will in turn af-
fect the issue of accountability. Kauzlarich et al. (2003:246) argue that acts of 
omission have a less direct, or causally distal relationship to state goals than do 
acts of commission. This seems to imply that the question of accountability be-
comes more complicated, and easier to distance from the state, regarding omis-
sions. 
The organization and purpose of the UN 
The UN was established in 1945 as an intergovernmental body and global forum 
in order to facilitate cooperation, decisions, and agreements between states on key 
issues (United Nations Association of Sweden [UNAS], 2017a:1). All 193 mem-
ber states are committed to complying with the UN Charter, which stipulates 
rights and obligations both between states and towards the organization. The 
Charter establishes the rules of procedure, organization, commission, and the 
tasks of the UN. The four main objectives of the UN are: (1) the maintenance of 
international peace and security; (2) the development of friendly relations be-
tween countries; (3) providing international cooperation for the promotion of de-
velopment and human rights, and; (4) providing an intermediate point for coun-
tries’ cooperation to achieve these goals (Ibid). However, the UN is neither world 
government nor world police, and the UN Charter clarifies that the organization 
should not violate the sovereign rights of states.  
 Since the founding of the UN, one of the biggest tasks of the organization has 
been that of developing and maintaining human rights (UNAS, 2017c:1). The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) regulates the relationship be-
tween states and individuals by limiting the state’s power over the individual 
while at the same time defining certain state obligations. The UDHR constitutes a 
moral guiding principle for the world, and since its introduction, human rights 
have become an international concern (Ibid.; Wigenmark, 2003:164f).  
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 The significant task of ensuring peace and security is largely handled by the 
Security Council. The council deals solely with issues relating to peace and con-
flicts in the world and investigates all situations that could lead to international 
conflict (UNAS, 2017c:1). However, since the UN and the Security Council were 
founded, both the world and the nature of conflict have changed. Today, many 
conflicts are internal rather than intergovernmental and they particularly affect 
civilian populations (Ibid:4). The Charter states that the UN has a responsibility 
to react if states expose their citizens to crimes such as forced labor, sexual vio-
lence and executions. Interventions of this nature should primarily be made based 
on peaceful means, encouragement and providing the state with assistance to pro-
tect its own citizens (UNAS, 2017b:4). If this fails, the UN has an obligation to 
intervene by all means available, including the use of military force.  
 To ensure that the UN can operate freely and pursue its missions without the 
interference of separate states, the organization has historically enjoyed absolute 
immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts (Freedman, 2014:241). Howev-
er, steps have recently been taken towards treating international organizations as 
quasi-states. This entails the application of restrictive foreign sovereign immunity 
to such organizations, which means that they are only protected in relation to ac-
tions that relate to their function. Nevertheless, most of the member states still 
grant the UN absolute immunity, even when the organization’s actions (and inac-
tion) cause harm (Ibid:243).  
 Following the recurrent reports and severe allegations of sexual abuse and sex 
purchases among UN peacekeeping forces, in 2003 then Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan introduced a zero-tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse 
for all personnel under UN command (Deschamps et al., 2015:4). However, each 
state that submits forces to UN peacekeeping missions is accountable for the 
troops’ behavior, and the individual states have the responsibility for acting 
against any misconduct. This is partly because the UN currently does not have the 
means to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators (Freedman, 2015). What the 
organization does have is a certain amount of political and financial power, which 
the UN could use to ensure that perpetrators are held accountable, something that 
the member states often fail to do. Unfortunately, the zero-tolerance policy, and 
the several high-level inquiries into the problem that has followed it, has had little 
effect. This is probably due to the UN having failed to properly implement the 
policy and most of the recommended changes from these reports. The organiza-
tion has since developed more policies, codes of conduct and training for its em-
ployees, but has not implemented such important recommendations as creating a 
permanent professional investigative mechanism (Ibid:16).  
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Previous research 
Some of the previous research in the field has focused on crimes committed by 
peacekeeping forces, on the conditions that may enable such crimes, and how 
they can be prevented (e.g. Johansson & Hultman, 2019, regarding sexual vio-
lence). Such research has tended to focus on the individual accountability of the 
perpetrators. Despite numerous reports of recurrent problems with various forms 
of crime committed by peacekeepers, it is unusual for states to prosecute their 
troops (O’Brien, 2012:224). Therefore, O’Brien (2012:225, 226, 239) argued that 
peacekeeping personnel could be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity before the International Criminal Court. However, this possibility in-
volves its own set of problems. With regard to UN accountability, some research 
has focused on whether actions that violate human rights may serve as a chal-
lenge to the organization’s immunity (Freedman, 2014:240ff). In a later article, 
Freedman (2018:975) has claimed that it is widely accepted that international law 
and general principles regarding responsibility are applicable to international or-
ganizations, and that the UN is seen as at least partially being bound by such laws 
and principles. It is still unclear, however, whether the UN is considered to be 
bound by international human rights law (Ibid.), even though upholding human 
rights constitutes part of the organization’s mission. This article contributes to the 
existing research in this field by delving further into the question of whether the 
UN’s immunity can be challenged in relation to human rights violations.  
The scandal of the Central African Republic 
After years of political instability and poor development, internal battles broke 
out in the CAR in 2013 (Deschamps et al., 2015:12). Large groups of the civilian 
population were exposed to violence and violations of their human rights, and 
hundreds of thousands of people fled their homes. Many sought shelter in tempo-
rary IDP camps, some of which were protected by international troops. One of 
these camps was M’Poko, just outside the capital Bangui, with as many as 
120,000 refugees estimated to have been living in the camp when the conflict was 
at its most serious. Due to the increasing security risk and a humanitarian, politi-
cal and human rights crisis, the UN Security Council decided to establish the 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Repub-
lic (MINUSCA), with an initial group of 10,000 peacekeeping soldiers. Their 
priority was to protect the civilian population, especially women and children 
(Ibid:13f).  
 In March 2014, the French force known as the Sangaris force, arrived in the 
CAR to support the UN forces and their work. The French soldiers did not for-
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mally belong to the troops that were under UN-command but had the support of 
and a mandate from the Security Council and were therefore to be regarded as 
part of the peacekeeping forces (Ibid:22). Within a few months of the Sangaris 
force’s arrival in the M’Poko area, the head of a non-governmental organization 
was notified that children were receiving food and money from some of the 
French soldiers in exchange for sexual services. The accusations were reported to 
the MINUSCA Human Rights and Justice Section and UNICEF’s Bangui Office 
and a minor investigation was conducted, in which six children were interviewed 
about the events. The investigation was later compiled into a confidential report 
called “Sangaris Notes”.  
 The sexual abuse reported in the Sangaris Notes proved to be so serious that it 
should have been classified under the UN-developed definition of conflict-related 
sexual violence, and as involving serious violations of international law and hu-
man rights (Ibid:20f). However, the report was passed from desk to desk at the 
UN headquarters without anyone acting. After UN officials in the CAR failed to 
forward and properly respond to the report, a human rights officer who had par-
ticipated in the investigation in the CAR, forwarded the “Sangaris Notes” to UN 
officials in Geneva where it ended up in the hands of Swedish UN official Anders 
Kompass (Ibid:57). He conveyed the report to the French delegation in Geneva 
shortly thereafter, which later led to his being accused of having “leaked” confi-
dential material to third parties. He was suspended from his position and placed 
under several investigations but was later cleared of the allegations by the inde-
pendent investigation, on which this article is based.  
 Despite the zero-tolerance policy introduced in 2003, and other attempts to 
implement preventive and punitive actions, the UN failed to put an end to the 
problems in the CAR. The Sangaris force was not considered part of the UN mis-
sion by the organization’s officials since it was not formally part of the peace-
keeping forces (Ibid:22). Representatives therefore assumed that the organization 
was not obliged to manage the allegations and that this responsibility rested with 
the French state. While the “Sangaris Notes” were passed around between UN 
officials, the victims were left without help and the perpetrators were able to con-
tinue with their abuse (Ibid:28). 
Can the UN be considered guilty of a state crime? 
Based on the concept of crimes of the powerful, the UN may be said to be an or-
ganization that possesses a substantial power capital. This is closely linked to the 
global trust enjoyed by the UN to safeguard the public interest in peace and secu-
rity among all the people of the world, a mission similar to that of a state towards 
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its citizens. In short, the UN may be viewed as a peace organization with a mo-
nopoly on violence (Wigenmark, 2003:169). The UN has also been involved in 
the creation of international laws and has created moral guiding principles for the 
rest of the world through the UDHR (UNAS, 2017c:1). When the organization 
violates these laws or neglects to prevent such crimes, it commits the same kind 
of atrocity as a state committing a state crime. For the purpose of this article, as a 
means of problematizing the UN’s accountability, the organization will here be 
equated with a state, and the events in the CAR and the organization’s manage-
ment of these events will be evaluated by means of a comparison with Kauzlarich 
et al.’s (2003) definition and conceptualization of the complicity continuum of 
state crime. 
 As was mentioned earlier, Kauzlarich et al. (2003:244ff) developed a compre-
hensive definition of state crime, which is divided into five concrete items. Ac-
cording to Kauzlarich and colleagues, state crime causes harm and is the product 
of an act or omission which violates a trust or obligation. The crime is executed 
by a government agency, organization or representative, and is performed with a 
vested interest. In order to analyze the events in the CAR as clearly as possible, 
the events will be separated into two potential crimes. The UN’s failure to pre-
vent the abuse performed by peacekeeping forces is viewed as one potential 
crime, and the UN’s handling of both the perpetrators and victims of the assaults 
is viewed as another. In the following section, these two potential crimes are ana-
lyzed individually in relation to each item included in the definition. 
Harm caused 
The UN’s failure to end the abuse perpetrated by peacekeeping forces has un-
doubtedly caused harm on multiple levels, both in general and in the current situ-
ation. The abuse was aimed at one of the most vulnerable groups that can be 
found globally, namely children who were in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. 
In the CAR, children had already been suffering as a result of being refugees and 
experiencing acts of violence, hunger and for many, the loss of close relatives 
(Deschamps et al., 2015:17). In this case, the abuse resulted in harm not only for 
specific individuals but also for the entire civilian group in the refugee camp at 
the time, a group that needed protection from the threat of expulsion and possibly 
also an imminent genocide. The abuse can be regarded as a further violation di-
rected at a group of already low status, which could be expected to be further re-
duced by sexual assault, for example as a result of shame and guilt. Also, the fact 
that the perpetrators were individuals who had been appointed to protect the 
group further aggravates both the abuse and the victims’ vulnerability.  
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 The way that the UN handled the problem can also be said to have caused 
harm. This is partly because the affected individuals did not receive the assistance 
and support that they needed and were entitled to (Deschamps et al., 2015:41f) 
and partly because the UN’s inability to investigate and sanction the guilty sol-
diers probably caused more people to suffer. The children initially received little 
help and it was only when the level of media attention grew that the UN followed 
up on the victims to ensure that those affected were given the help to which they 
were entitled. This was however not the whole truth according to the British jour-
nalist Ramita Navai, who investigated UN aid programs in several areas affected 
by sexual abuse, including the events in the CAR (SVT, 2018). According to the 
testimony of several individuals, the organization had still failed to find and iden-
tify many of the victims years after the events, even though the journalist had 
managed to find several in a matter of days. 
Act or omission 
The UN has a responsibility towards its member states and their civilian popula-
tions. This resembles the responsibility of a state towards its subjects. The fact 
that the UN has had issues with sexual assaults among its peacekeepers for many 
years without the organization having succeeded in resolving these problems is a 
clear failure. At the time of the assaults in the CAR, twelve years had passed 
since the introduction of the zero-tolerance policy, and yet the problems contin-
ued. The UN’s main task is to promote human rights and work to combat such 
violations and this work must also be undertaken within the organization itself. 
The result of the neglect has been that neither victims nor perpetrators have been 
given any reason to believe that such behavior will be detected and punished, re-
sulting in a permissive culture within the peacekeeping forces and very probably 
in very few victims reporting such incidents.  
 The deficient management of the sexual assaults in the CAR was a result of 
the organization’s negligent behavior towards the information that was provided 
about the events (Deschamps et al., 2015:i). Several of the officials who should 
have responded and acted against the assaults believed that the organization had 
no obligation to act since the Sangaris force was not under the direct command of 
the UN (Ibid:28). This belief was correct in the sense that the zero-tolerance poli-
cy applies only to personnel under UN command. However, ultimately it was in-
correct since the UN’s overall mission means that the organization is required to 
promote human rights and prevent violations of international law, even in situa-
tions where the original mission is a different one (Ibid:22f, 25). In this case, part 
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of the original mission was also to protect the population from sexual violence 
and other forms of abuse (Ibid:26). 
Trust and obligations 
It can be argued that the UN, as a representative of the international community 
and as the only peacekeeping organization with a monopoly on violence, pos-
sesses a substantial capital of trust. It is reasonable to assume that the internation-
al community trusts the organization to take its main tasks seriously and not only 
to prevent and counter violations of human rights globally but also to ensure that 
the organization itself leads by example. Failure to prevent violations and in-
fringements of this kind within the organization must be regarded as the ultimate 
crime against this trust. Even the peacekeeping forces themselves generally enjoy 
a high level of trust and the dependence from the international community regard-
ing their ability to help vulnerable groups. Even in the CAR, it must be assumed 
that the peacekeeping forces managed to save thousands of people from being in-
jured or killed (Deschamps et al., 2015:xiii). Therefore, the UN violated not only 
one but two clear mandates of trust and established obligations. 
 As regards the management of the abuse, this can also be said to have violated 
the public’s trust. The representatives of the organization chose not to act on the 
information made available to them even though they had an obligation to do so. 
As the main advocate of human rights, peace and security, the international 
community expects the UN to act in accordance with its main mission, but in this 
case, the organization chose to displace its responsibility and ascribe it to the 
Sangaris force’s home nation France, thus turning a blind eye to its own respon-
sibility. 
Agency, organization or representative 
According to Kauzlarich et al. (2003:246), this is a crucial point because the 
state’s involvement is, of course, a necessity for a crime to be a state crime rather 
than some other form of crime. Despite the preparation of several policies and 
other measures, the UN’s internal organization has failed, or has not done 
enough, to avert and prevent continued abuse. The responsibility for this failure 
lies with the organization. The same applies to the management of the problems 
in the CAR. The officials who in this case were informed of the abuse problems, 
but did not act, work within and represent the “state” of the UN. 
Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab 3/2019 
326 
Vested interest 
This analysis only explores the perspective of the UN as a state, since the concept 
of a ruling class within the UN was deemed too complex for this example.  
 Violations such as the ones in the CAR can hardly be said to favor anyone 
other than the perpetrator. It is not only likely, but rather inevitable, that the ac-
cumulated trust and reputation of the UN was negatively affected by these behav-
iors, and that continued problems with such behaviors will sooner or later affect 
the organization to a large extent. Without its capital of trust, the UN cannot func-
tion as it is meant to and it is therefore, presumably, in the interest of the organi-
zation to put an end to all forms of abuse and violations among its staff. Howev-
er, the organization has displaced the responsibility for punishing perpetrators, as 
is demonstrated in the zero-tolerance policy, on the member states (Deschamps et 
al., 2015:25). This meant that the UN deprived itself of the opportunity to partici-
pate in and follow up any such punishment processes, and it therefore has diffi-
culty estimating to what extent perpetrators are really held accountable. This may 
have been an attempt to avoid accountability for such problems, which indirectly 
places the burden of the unacceptable behavior on the states. If the responsibility 
lies with someone other than the UN, it is likely that the continued abuse will not 
reflect as badly on the organization. 
 It can also be argued that the organization failed because its officials were try-
ing to cover up the scandal. When the French authorities requested UN support to 
investigate the allegations, the organization’s work focused on finding the whis-
tleblower who had informed the French, while the victims and their needs were 
left unattended to (Deschamps et al., 2015:i). This surprising focus from parts of 
the UN’s highest leadership can undoubtedly be interpreted as the organization 
attempting to avoid another scandal by silencing the allegations, so that the UN 
“state” would not be drawn into in yet another spiral of accusations that would 
threaten to affect the organization’s trust and reputation.  
UN participation 
In relation to the complicity continuum of state crime, the assaults in the CAR 
may be considered an act of omission on the part of the UN, since the organiza-
tion has had a long history of problems of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation 
among its peacekeeping forces. Despite repeated efforts, the UN has failed to 
overcome these problems. In defense of the organization, several new policies 
have been developed, rules have been tightened and the assaults have been pub-
licly condemned. It is obvious however that the measures taken to resolve the 
problems have been insufficient, and it is reasonable to assume that the organiza-
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tion is aware of this. The UN may be considered to have acted negligently to-
wards enforcing its own policies, and the organization has made great efforts to 
displace both the responsibility to protect civilians, and the management of its 
own staff. The events in the CAR may therefore be considered to constitute ex-
plicit rather than implicit acts of omission.  
 As regards the management of the problems in the CAR, this may also be 
considered an explicit act of omission, since the UN officials chose not to act on 
the information that had been shared with the organization. Although the officials 
in question believed that they did not have the mandate to act against the abuse, 
the independent investigation has concluded that they should have acted on the 
basis of the organization’s main objective being that of safeguarding human 
rights (Deschamps et al., 2015:22f, 25). It would be reasonable to assume that 
representatives of the organization were, or should have been, aware that they had 
a responsibility to act. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this article has been to problematize the events in the CAR on the 
assumption that the UN can be equated with a state, and for this purpose the UN 
may be considered to have committed at least one state crime, namely the defi-
cient management of the assaults in the CAR. Since the organization’s omission 
(to prevent the assaults and to deal with the problems adequately) has caused 
harm (for individuals and a civic group), the UN has violated a trust given to the 
organization by the international community. In addition, the attempt to cover up 
the scandal may have been in the interests of the organization.  
 The failure to properly manage the allegations in the CAR, and the UN’s be-
havior towards Anders Kompass, is noteworthy since the organization seems to 
have been more focused on covering up the abuse than stopping it. The decision 
to suspend Kompass might even serve to discourage future whistleblowers within 
the organization (Burke, 2016:99). This is potentially a serious problem, since al-
legations of sexual abuse performed by peacekeepers in the CAR have continued 
following the conclusion of the independent investigation.  
 Because of the substantial trust and political mandate enjoyed by the UN, the 
organization may be said to hold such a high position in the global social struc-
ture that any harmful actions or omissions by the organization may be considered 
to fall under the concept of crimes of the powerful. Although the UN does not en-
joy political power to the same extent as, for example, the EU, and thus does not 
have direct political influence over its member states, the organization still has 
the power to make certain types of decisions with which members must comply 
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(UNAS, 2017a:1f). However, the UN can never be more powerful than the mem-
ber states allows it to be. 
 Through the analysis it was made clear that a similar event, in which one of 
the member states had been responsible, could have been treated as a state crime 
(Kauzlarich et al., 2003:244ff). Since the UN clearly has failed to take enough re-
sponsibility in areas connected to its main mission, it may seem remarkable that 
the organization has not been held accountable for its omissions in the same way 
a state would have been.  
 In relation to the complicity continuum, both potential crimes can be consid-
ered to constitute explicit acts of omission. The responsibility to prevent and 
counter violations like those in the CAR is clearly stated in the UN Charter; this 
responsibility is formulated in the organization’s main objectives, and in addition, 
it constituted part of the specific instructions for the UN mission in the CAR 
(Deschamps et al., 2015:22f, 25, 26). Neither the UN nor the international com-
munity can reasonably deny that the organization is responsible for the failure to 
prevent these events. In terms of dealing with the abuse, the organization should 
have been aware that it was obliged to act based on its mandate to safeguard hu-
man rights in all situations. This is the same framework that imposes on the or-
ganization the responsibility to prevent sexual abuse in the first place (Ibid.). Of 
course, this is not to say that there is intent behind these omissions, since the risk 
is imminent that the sexual abuse will negatively affect the UN’s mandate to act 
in conflicts, and without solving these problems, the future of similar operations 
may be in jeopardy (Deschamps et al., 2015:ii).  
 This article therefore argues that the issue of responsibility, regarding the 
events in the CAR, can be considered to be settled. The remaining question is if 
and how this can be used to hold the UN accountable. As shown through the 
analysis, the recurrent problem of sexual abuse committed by peacekeepers is a 
matter of violations of human rights. According to Freedman (2014:240ff) human 
rights violations may present a challenge to UN immunity. The International 
community must make up its mind about whether or not the UN should be held 
accountable for, not only failing but violating its core mission, to work to uphold 
human rights. International organizations in general are considered to be bound 
by international law and international human rights law (Freedman 2018:975). 
The UN, arguably the most powerful international organization, should therefore 
be held responsible and accountable for any violations against such law. 
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Conclusion 
This article has found that even if the failure to prevent sexual abuse does not 
meet all the requirements of Kauzlarich et al.’s (2003:244f) definition of a state 
crime, the fact is that sexual assaults have been committed in an almost systemat-
ic way by parts of the UN peacekeeping forces for the past 30 years. The organi-
zation seems perplexed, pointing with one hand to the member states’ responsi-
bility and with the other to the actions it has taken, although these “new” policies 
continue to displace the organization’s responsibility onto the member states. At 
present the UN cannot be held accountable for a state crime. The question must 
nevertheless be asked: at what point will the international community hold the 
UN accountable for its’ failures, and what will the consequences be? 
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